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Abstract 
At the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, special 
attention was paid to cyber security. Heads of 
State and Government recognized cyberspace as 
a new operational environment in which NATO 
has the same defence functions as in the air on 
land, and sea. The aim was set at enhancing the 
protection of the networks of the Alliance and, 
after the 2014 Wales Summit, the extension of 
the collective protection to cyberspace was 
repeatedly declared. This means that if a 
coordinated cyberattack is launched against one 
of its member states, NATO will consider it as an 
attack against the Alliance as a whole. However, 
the question arises: what states or organizations 
are capable of preparing and executing such an 
attack. The following study presents what are the 
computer network operations which comprise the 
basis for such an attack, what conflicts have 
taken place in this area in recent years, and what 
potentials the world's leading powers have in 
terms of computer network warfare. The work 
was created in commission of the National 
University of Public Service under the priority 
project KÖFOP-2.1.2-VEKOP-15-2016-00001 
titled „Public Service Development Establishing 
Good Governance” in Győző Concha Doctoral 
Program. 
Keywords: computer network warfare, cyber 
defence, cyberattack  
 
 
Absztrakt 
A NATO varsói csúcstalálkozóján 2016-ban 
kiemelt figyelmet kapott a kiberbiztonság. Az 
állam- és kormányfők a kiberteret új műveleti 
környezetként ismerték el, melyben a NATO-nak 
ugyanúgy védelemi feladatai vannak, mint a 
szárazföldön, a tengeren vagy a levegőben. Célul 
tűzték ki a szövetséges hálózatok fokozott 
védelmét, valamint a 2014-es walesi 
csúcstalálkozó után újból deklarálták a kollektív 
védelem kibertérre történő kiterjesztését. Ez azt 
jelenti, hogyha az egyik tagállama ellen koordinált 
kibertámadás történik, azt a NATO a szövetség 
egésze elleni támadásnak fogja tekinteni. 
Felmerül azonban a kérdés, hogy kik azok az 
államok vagy szervezetek, akik képesek ilyen 
támadást előkészíteni, megvalósítani. Az alábbi 
tanulmány bemutatja, hogy mik is azok a 
számítógép-hálózati műveletek, amelyek egy 
ilyen támadás alapjait képezik, milyen 
konfliktusok voltak az elmúlt időben ezen a 
területen és hogy a világ vezető hatalmai milyen 
potenciállal rendelkeznek a számítógép-hálózati 
hadviselés tekintetében. A mű a KÖFOP-2.1.2-
VEKOP-15-2016-00001 azonosítószámú, „A jó 
kormányzást megalapozó közszolgálat-
fejlesztés” elnevezésű kiemelt projekt keretében 
működtetett Concha Győző Doktori Program 
keretében, a Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem 
felkérésére készült. 
Kulcsszavak: számítógép-hálózati hadviselés, 
kibervédelem, kibertámadás 
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INTRODUCTION 
By the present information technology has penetrated societies to such an extent that not only 
industrial, financial, or governmental work but also the daily life of people could be possible to 
envisage without computers. This fact is proven by the data stating that in March 2017 49.7% 
of the total population of the World – more than 3.7 billion people – used the internet (77.4% 
of the population of Europe, and 88.1% of North America). [1] It does not seem to be an 
exaggeration to state that modern people are significantly addicted to information technology 
systems.  
However, the IT devices and services making daily life easier have significant security risks 
as well. An increasing amount of information is available about various computer attacks 
committed and damage made. Reference can be made to ransomware recently paralysing even 
hospitals, which encrypted the data on computers and demanded money for them, or to attacks 
launched against banks and their clients, aimed at getting sensitive customers’ information. A 
large number of malicious hackers may be met on the internet. Simple criminals who want your 
money, spies who want to get our secrets, fanatics who want to grab our attention because of 
their political views or religious convictions. Such people or groups carry out their attacks with 
the use of various IT methodology which ranges from hacking web sites to sending letters with 
malicious codes and to hacking into computer networks. The methods are similar, the goals 
make the difference.  
The rapid development of information technology also affected military organisations and 
law enforcement agencies because the devices they operate and the collected, processed and 
stored data are of national security significance therefore their protection is top priority. It was 
quickly realised how great significance it would be in the course of a potential conflict if similar 
systems of the adversary party could be successfully attacked, the stored data could be obtained, 
altered, or destroyed. Therefore, besides making the protection as efficient as possible, the 
elaboration of the ways of attacks also began.  
In this article I wish to present the computer network warfare, the results achieved in this 
field by the leading powers of the World, and their relating capabilities.  
COMPUTER NETWORK OPERATIONS  
Before a detailed description of the computer network warfare, its position within military 
operations should be introduced. An activity defined as computer network operations comprises 
an organic part of information operations. In NATO information operations are detailed in 
doctrine AJP 3.10 while in the Hungarian Defence Forces it is the Information Operations 
Doctrine, issued in 2014, which deals with the question. In the framework of information 
operations closely related activities are integrated in order to achieve information superiority in 
military operations, in order to have information domination and leading superiority through 
achieving time reduction for friendly forces and time expansion for the opposing party. In 
practice, more reliable information can be obtained by friendly parties in shorter time than by 
the opposing party, which allows making conclusions for good decisions to be made. All this 
may provide operational superiority as well. Such activities have their impact in the physical, 
information, and conscious dimensions. Apart from computer network warfare, these activities 
are also part of electronic warfare, psychological operations, operational security, military 
deception, and physical destruction, and even civil-military cooperation and mass 
communication can also fall into this category. [2, p185]  
The figure below illustrates the position of computer network operations within information 
operations.  
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Fig. 1. Computer Network Operations in the Information Operations  
(drawn by the author based on reference No. 2, p 198)  
 
Military experts in the United States use a somewhat different approach. A new concept of 
operation was elaborated, which was published in doctrine FM 3-38, entitled Cyber 
Electromagnetic Activities. It means that electronic warfare, cyber operations, and frequency-
management operations are integrated and synchronised in order to have mutually 
complementing and reinforcing effects. It is easy to understand that the lack of cooperation 
among the above activities would reduce the efficiency of operations, and generate undesirable 
clashes and interferences among devices and systems used in the electromagnetic spectrum. [3, 
p122] The name of computer network operations was also changed and the term Cyberspace 
Operations1 was introduced. Cyberspace is recognised as a domain of warfare which is equal 
in significance with land, air, sea, and space dimensions of operations. Cyberspace operations 
are divided into offensive and defensive operations and are complemented with a third element: 
the military information network operations.  
In accordance with the definition of the doctrine: „Cyber electromagnetic activities are 
activities leveraged to seize, retain, and exploit an advantage over adversaries and enemies in 
both cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum, while simultaneously denying and 
degrading adversary and enemy use of the same and protecting the mission command system.” 
[4]  
This concept is illustrated with the figure below:  
                                                 
 
1 Abbreviated: CO  
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Fig. 2. Cyber electromagnetic activities  
(source: [4 p1-2])  
Computer network operations may be divided into two major groups. Offensive operations 
are aimed at mapping adversary IT systems in a network, influencing, degrading, and paralysing 
their operation, while defensive activities mean the protection of friendly computer networks 
from the information attacks of adversaries.  
A computer network attack is a software- or hardware-based penetration into the information 
system of the attacked party with the aim to destroy, modify, or make inaccessible data stored 
there, or to make the operation of the system impossible in itself. Such attacks are executed by 
well-prepared IT experts, so called hackers, who know information systems better than anybody 
else at a standard or user level, are able to illegally enter the networks at their weak points, gain 
right of access and make various operations there. [2, p228] It is important to note that such 
experts do not always use their knowledge only for harmful purposes as they may work on 
eliminating the weak points of a system as well. In this case such activities are labelled as ethical 
hacking.  
Malicious software and its large number of sub-types must be highlighted among the means 
of computer attacks. The well known viruses are programs which add their own program codes 
to another program and this way they multiply and spread. Usually they have two main parts; 
one is responsible for the spread while the other is the core which contains the activity to 
execute. Computer worms are standalone programs which are capable of multiplication, and 
spreading themselves. Their structure is similar to that of viruses but usually they have an 
additional part of program responsible for disguise making more difficult to disclose and 
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identify them. Trojan programs are seemingly useful applications with useful functions, 
however, besides their original functions they execute unwanted operations too. There are also 
various types of spyware, keyboard tracers, and their countless combinations. [3, p131]  
Another frequently used method is the use of botnets or zombie networks. A zombie 
computer is a computer under the control of a malicious hacker through Trojan software. 
Afterwards the capacities of the computer are used for the attacker’s purposes, often for 
launching DDoS2 attacks. Botnets are the networks of such zombie computers. If attackers have 
an appropriate amount of zombie computers, they may be able to overload the selected target 
thus making it inoperable. Computers controlled such way are also used for sending masses of 
spams – unwanted letters. It is important to note here that such devices are used not just in the 
field of computer network operations but also by criminals and other malicious attackers.  
Obviously, operations of defensive nature are aimed at protecting friendly information 
systems against adversaries’ offensive activities. The tools of defensive operations are firewalls 
which filter illegal network traffics, and various types of antivirus software which recognise 
and destroy malicious codes.  
It is very important to underline that computer network operations takes place only when a 
country launches an attack against the computer networks and critical infrastructures of another 
state with the use of information technology and physical means on its own account or with the 
involvement of a third party. Such a third party may be a state, an organisation, or a group. 
However, this has been impossible to prove in relation to the attacks of the past years because 
all suspected countries categorically denied the accusations.  
MAJOR ATTACKS TO DATE  
According to special literature the very first documented cyberattack was launched by a Sri 
Lanka terrorist organisation, the Tamil Tigers, in 1997. [5] Their method would seem fanciful 
nowadays – they flooded governmental sites with unwanted e-mails.  
In 1999 Serbian hackers – in response to the NATO air campaign over Serbia – attacked the 
servers of the Alliance and made some of them inaccessible for a while with the use of DDoS 
method, and also broke in some web sites and placed there propaganda messages.  
The first cyberattack launched against a country happened in 2007. In Estonia, which has 
highly developed IT culture, riots broke out due to the removal of a Soviet war monument from 
downtown Tallinn on 27th April 2007. The first signs of DDoS attacks appeared a few days 
after the first protest demonstrations, and were targeting the servers of Parliament, government 
offices, ministries, banks, telephone companies, and media companies. The selection of targets, 
the coordination, precise execution, and efficiency of attacks clearly indicated that there were 
organised forces in the background of the attacks. In a few cases it was established that the 
attacks had been launched from Russian servers, which was denied by Russian authorities, of 
course. At the same time the nature of the attacked servers indicates that the clear objective of 
the attacks was to paralyse the critical information infrastructure of the Baltic state. The key 
servers, responsible for the on-line data traffic of the country collapsed on a daily basis, and the 
networks of many state institutions had to be temporarily disconnected from the internet. 
Electronic banking and trade either ceased or significantly stalled. According to some experts 
the cyberattack inflicted much more significant economic damage to Estonia than the trade 
sanctions could have which Russia threatened the country with in the first weeks of the crisis.  
                                                 
 
2 Distributed Denial of Service  
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Although NATO experts were also involved in the initial phase of the investigation, due to 
the nature of the attacks it was nearly impossible to identify the attackers. Although many of 
them could be identified in Russia, it was impossible to clearly prove that governmental servers 
were involved in the action. According to generally accepted views Russian hackers with 
patriotic emotions established a botnet in which apart from Russian computers hardware in 
another 178 countries were also involved without their knowledge (zombie computers) and the 
attacks were executed through them. [5]  
The Russo-Georgian war in August 2008 also had a cyber aspect. As it is well known, the 
president of Georgia tried to resolve the long-lasting Georgian-Ossetian and Georgian-
Abkhazian conflict through attacking the mentioned territories with the use of military force on 
8th August 2008. However, he had miscalculated the situation when had not taken into account 
that Russia would not tolerate the attack inter alia because it had troops stationed in South 
Ossetia involved in a peacekeeping mission under UN mandate. The Russian troops delivered 
powerful counterstrikes at the Georgian forces and after five days of heavy fighting Georgia 
was forced to request a ceasefire. [6]  
During the armed conflict a cyber campaign was also launched against Georgia. Russia– or 
at least somebody in Russia – took control of internet traffic, according to the Georgian 
government, which was virtually forced into a cyber emigration and besides the war reports a 
large number of reports were also issued about virtual attacks. [7]  
The most spectacular hacker actions were launched against the country’s governmental web 
sites which were paralysed from outside and their contents were changed.3 The hackers from 
Russia vandalised the portraits of president Saakashvili. Hitler-moustaches were drawn on the 
images of the head of Georgian government and a number of pictures of him were published 
depicting him posing as the Nazi dictator or copied his portrait among the greatest thugs of 
human history.  
At the same time web sites aimed at discrediting the country were also established for 
disinformation purposes – the blog continuously reporting about the conflict listed the credible 
sources among the links. In the Caucasian country web sites with domain extension .ru also 
became inaccessible. According to some sources, they were blocked by the Georgian 
government itself in order to halt Russian propaganda and the workers of the Russian embassy 
in Tbilisi claimed that there had been problems with mobile phone and landline telephone 
services too (although that must have been because of the military offensive). [8]  
In my opinion the Georgian government clearly exaggerated the cyberattacks launched 
against it since Georgia did not have such highly developed infrastructure as, for example, 
Estonia therefore the cyberattacks did not have such a serious impact: neither the banking 
system nor public administration got paralysed. Large scale attacks on the internet are 
particularly effective if they are launched against a country which strongly relies on information 
technology and on its infrastructure. In the case of Georgia this was not the case: through the 
internet the attackers were not able to inflict more damage than the Russian soldiers stepping 
on the soil of the country. It is not easy to understand why the government focused on the 
cyberattacks while Georgian towns and infrastructure were bombarded by Russian forces. 
Nevertheless, this was the conflict where cyber operations were also used for supporting 
conventional military operations.  
It can be stated both in connection with the Russian-Estonian and Russian-Georgian conflicts 
that Russian official authorities categorically denied their involvement in the attacks. The post-
                                                 
 
3 In internet jargon: defacement.   
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conflict analyses could only establish that the attackers were motivated by Russian nationalistic 
emotions, however, it was impossible to prove the participation of any Russian state agencies.  
Attacks targeting some critical infrastructures should not be ignored either. These facilities 
may comprise part of electric works, power stations, or other vital systems. There have been 
several attacks in the World (Brazil, Turkey) resulting in the breakdown of electric supply 
caused by a cyberattack. In December 2015 an attack of such type was also registered in 
Ukraine, which resulted in a several-hour-long blackout affecting 1.4 million people. [9]  
Malicious codes used for attacking critical infrastructure and industrial process control 
systems have become increasingly developed and sophisticated in recent years. The creators of 
such codes put great emphasis on the development of the hiding capabilities of their programs, 
thus making them more difficult to detect. A typical and notorious example of these programs 
is the new malicious code, named Stuxnet, discovered by the Belarusian VirusBlockAda in June 
2010.  
The new worm spread on Microsoft operating systems and was developed exclusively 
against industrial process control systems. The exceptional nature and specialization of Stuxnet 
is highlighted by the fact that these industrial surveillance, control and data collection systems 
are manufactured by a single company, German Siemens (SIMATIC WinCC HMI and 
WIMATIC STEP 7) and are basically used in heavy industry, energy production, and 
transportation. This means, the threat is presented basically for facilities only, some of which 
are classified as critical infrastructures. [10]  
Stuxnet's ultimate goal was to reprogram the automatic processes of industrial control 
systems. It primarily attacked PLC4 software. Software WinCC / Step 7 was the primary of all 
Stuxnet targets. This software connects to the PLC via a data cable, reaches memory content, 
is capable of re-configuring processes and uploading programs, and performs some tracking 
functions during the execution phase. If the PLC has already been programmed, it can be 
switched off and the PLC is able to operate on its own. Stuxnet used this software to enter its 
code blocks into the PLC and then hid them.  
Stuxnet searched the PLCs for specific industrial devices, namely frequency converters of 
high-speed motors, and only entered into action when it found the Finnish Vacon or Iranian 
Fararo Paya devices, and if the monitored device operated between 807 and 1210 Hz. Such 
frequency converters and motors are used almost exclusively in Iranian uranium enrichment 
facilities. [11]  
The clear purpose of the virus was the undetectable destruction of uranium enrichment 
centrifuges and the degradation of the enrichment process. This goal was successfully achieved 
since at least 1,000 centrifuges were made unusable in the Natanz enrichment facility and, 
according to many experts’ opinions, disrupted the Iranian nuclear program for at least two 
years.  
It is a proof for the professionalism of the writing of the attack code that it exploited four 
zero-day5 threats simultaneously, and certified its legitimacy with two stolen digital signatures.  
                                                 
 
4 PLC - Programmable Logic Controller, used in large numbers in industrial regulation technology, various electric 
processes, and procedures operated this way.  
5 Term zero-day/zero-hour is used for describing computer security threats which exploit a undisclosed, 
unpublished vulnerability of a given IT application. Having disclosed a vulnerability the attacker makes a so called 
zero-day exploit which is a computer code capable of exploiting the particular vulnerability. However, because of 
the difficult detectability of vulnerabilities the makers of malware a disclosed vulnerability is of significant 
significance and value therefore one program is usually based only for the exploitation of one vulnerability. During 
such attacks the developer of the attacked application is usually unaware of the vulnerability or has not been able 
to make corrections.  
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There were no accurate data about its origins for a long time, but everyone thought of the 
United States and Israel as of the two countries which were capable of and interested in 
launching an action against the Iranian nuclear program. In his blog Ralph Langner, a Hamburg 
virus security expert, was deeply involved with Stuxnet and in his post on 31st December 2010 
he wrote:  
„The forces behind such a high-profile attack can be traced easily. Stuxnet required an 
extreme amount of intelligence about the Natanz plant layout, a full understanding of the IR-16 
operation (presumably with a mockup test system available), and an extreme amount of insider 
knowledge of the Siemens products involved. This limits the search for the originators to very 
few organizations in the world.” [12]  
In February 2016, Alex Gibney's documentary Zero Days was presented at the Berlin 
International Film Festival, which deals with this topic. The film also features General Michael 
Hayden, who was also head of the CIA7 and the NSA8. In the documentary he acknowledges 
that Stuxnet was developed in cooperation with Israel, and targeted specifically Iran's nuclear 
program. [13]  
But Stuxnet was just the beginning of a new generation of malware. In 2011 and 2012 the 
staff at CrySyS Data and System Security Laboratory at the Budapest University of Technology 
discovered Duqu, and sKyWiper codes respectively, which were also very sophisticated and 
state-of-the-art tools and some state involvement in their development could be almost taken 
for granted. In early 2015, Kaspersky Lab found a new malicious code labelled as Duqu 2. The 
new code is the most sophisticated the Lab’s workers have ever met, and its creators’ mindset 
and philosophy are completely new. According to the company’s senior researcher, that 
spyware had been used for attacking around 100 targets, including luxury hotels in which Great 
Power negotiations aimed at curbing the Iranian nuclear weapons program were conducted. 
[14] 
At the same time the quantity of attacks and ransomware keeps rising continuously. In May 
2017, for example, a large-scale ransomware campaign was launched worldwide. The 
ransomware cryptoworm, named WannaCry, infected tens of thousands of computers in a few 
hours’ time and encrypted their files. The global cyberattacks generated significant 
interruptions and delays all over the world, for example, in the affected British hospitals a large 
number of operations had to be postponed due to the unserviceability of their IT hardware. A 
few weeks before the attack, hacker group The Shadow Brokers had leaked a tool EternalBlue, 
allegedly used by the NSA for breaking in distant computers with the use of a security breach 
of the Windows operating system. [15] WannaCry usually got in the computer of a victim 
wrapped in an e-mail, however, through a generally used network protocol (SMB) it easily 
propagated onto other workstations of the network. Although Microsoft had completed the 
correction of the mistake, at the time of the attack many users still failed to install that on their 
computers. The further destruction caused by the ransomware was prevented by a British IT 
expert who discovered a switch in the software disallowing its further propagation.  
A few weeks later another ransomware appeared which also encrypted the files on the 
attacked and infected computer. The malware named Petya began attacking Ukrainian targets 
and very soon appeared in other countries as well. The propagation of the worm started through 
a seemingly entirely innocent accounting software upgrade widely used in Ukraine, coming 
from a completely secure source. For further propagation in networks this ransomware also 
                                                 
 
6 The name of the Iranian variant of Pakistani P-1 uranium-enrichment centrifuge, given by the outside world.  
7 Central Intelligence Agency  
8 National Security Agency  
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used EthernalBlue. According to experts both its operation and settings indicated that the 
hackers’ objective was not financial profit making but rather destruction and panic-mongering. 
[16]  
These data also underpin the fact that a lot of military organisations and government bodies 
in the world are seeking to gain decisive influence in cyberspace, not only to strive for 
capabilities to fend off attacks, but also to have an attack capability.  
Fending off IT attacks has now become a top priority in the World. Everywhere it has been 
realized that cyber security is essential and key information systems need to be protected against 
cyberattacks. In May 2008, the Cooperative Cyber-defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCoE) 
was established. On 14th May, the Memorandum of Understanding was signed by the founding 
countries, the Baltic States, Germany, Spain, Italy and Slovakia. On 28th October 2008, by the 
decision of the North Atlantic Council, the Centre was legally declared an international military 
organization. The fact that the Centre was established in Tallinn, Estonia's capital is a significant 
indication. The Centre’s tasks include, inter alia, support to the development of member state 
cyber capabilities, that of national doctrines, concepts and strategies, training in the field of 
information security, conduct of continuous training programs and exercises, and the analysis 
of the legal aspects of cyber-warfare. That is, the organization does not represent NATO's 
offensive cyberattack capabilities, but functions as a research and education centre. Hungary 
joined the work of the Centre on 23rd June 2010.  
A publication, issued in 2013, was compiled by internationally renowned lawyers, technical 
specialists and researchers and was titled "Tallinn Handbook on the International Law 
Applicable to Cyber Warfare". This manual covers the regulation of cyber warfare, detailing 
them in 95 major rules in 2 parts, on more than 300 pages. The title of the first part is 
“International Cyber Security Law” and that of the second is “The Law of Cyber Armed 
Conflict”. It is stated that a cyberattack can be classified as an armed attack, so that the attacked 
state can legitimately use even conventional weapons for self-defence. However, cyber-
espionage, cyber-bullying or cyber-harassment, and hacking websites are not considered as 
armed attacks. It is pointed out that civilian casualties must be avoided, that is civilian targets, 
hospitals, nuclear power plants, hydroelectric power stations or dams must not be attacked – as 
is the case with traditional armed conflicts – which is now prohibited for the belligerents by the 
Geneva Conventions. The principle of proportionality should also apply to cyber warfare, on 
the basis of which the attacked party cannot inflict much greater losses to the attacker than it 
has suffered before.  
It can be stated that outstanding work has been compiled in the field of regulating cyber-
warfare, which does not have compulsory recommendations, nevertheless the preliminary 
wide-range consultations resulted in establishing principles which may be well used in the 
legislation of individual countries. [17] 2017 saw the publication of version 2.0 of the manual, 
extended with legal analyses and case studies.  
NATO regards attacks in cyberspace as a significant threat. At the Summit Meeting held in 
Warsaw on 8th and 9th July 2016 the objective was set to develop cyber defence, to integrate it 
into planning processes at a larger extent, and to increase the protection of national and allied 
networks with the use of the most up-to-date technologies. After the 2014 Wales Summit 
Meeting the extension of collective defence on cyberspace was declared again. [18]  
As it has been mentioned above the Tallinn centre does not develop NATO’s offensive cyber 
capabilities – the organisation does not even have a program of such type – however, certain 
member states deal with developing offensive capabilities although this process is not open to 
public scrutiny. In many countries of the World research programs were launched besides 
increasing their cyber-defence capabilities to the highest possible level to enhance their 
offensive capabilities as well.  
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CNO CAPABILITIES IN THE WORLD 
The United States, both as the country of origin of internet and the leading power of the World, 
makes extremely huge efforts to preserve its positions in cyberspace. Taking this into account 
the Department of Defence approved a resolution on the establishment of a military Command 
which would coordinate cyber-defence at national level. The USCYBERCOM9 started its 
operation in subordination to the Strategic Command of the United States, in Fort Mead, 
Maryland, in 2010. According to its mission statement:  
„USCYBERCOM plans, coordinates, integrates, synchronizes and conducts activities to: 
direct the operations and defense of specified Department of Defense information networks 
and; prepare to, and when directed, conduct full spectrum military cyberspace operations in 
order to enable actions in all domains, ensure US/Allied freedom of action in cyberspace and 
deny the same to our adversaries.” [19]  
All cyber operations military units of every service were subordinated to the new Command. 
This means: U.S Army Forces Cyber Command, 24th USAF, Fleet Cyber Command and 
Marine Forces Cyber Command. Its full operational capacity is expected to be reached in 2018, 
when 6,200 personnel will serve there. Its activity is coordinated with the NSA, responsible for 
electronic intelligence. The commander of the unit is also the director general of the NSA. [20] 
The proper reason for the development of operational capabilities was the growing threat that 
the US military and civil IT networks were facing. The Command has to be capable of 
delivering an appropriate counterstrike in cyberspace in the case of a traditional or an IT attack 
targeting the country. A cyberattack can be ordered by the President of the United States of 
America either as a response to an attack against the military or civil computer networks of the 
country, or in order to prevent such an attack. The methodology of defence from cyberattacks 
against the US, and that of counterstrikes were laid down in the International Cyber-security 
Strategy, issued in 2011.  
In accordance with the strategy, American cyber defence is based on prevention and 
deterrence. The basis of prevention is international cooperation. The establishment of 
international law enforcement cooperation is encouraged, which would allow further 
enhancement of countering crime and terrorism. In accordance with the Strategy, as the legal 
grounds of a counterstrike following a cyberattack launched against the US by a nation state, 
activities conducted in cyberspace also belong to the responsibilities of sovereign nation states, 
comprising the international community. In accordance with the Strategy, in the case of a 
cyberattack launched against either the US or its allies the US may take any necessary 
diplomatic, economic, and military measures. On the basis of the Strategy, the US may respond 
to a cyberattack with a traditional military strike as well. [21]  
The role of the NSA must also be mentioned in connection with American cyber activities. 
This organisation functions in subordination to the Department of Defence and was established 
primarily for signals intelligence on 4th November 1952. Its scope covers foreign signals 
intelligence, cryptography – that is deciphering foreign codes and the protection of the security 
of American codes – and all types of electronic intelligence. [22]  
The NSA was one of the protagonists of Operation ECHELON, which was launched as early 
as the Cold War but continued afterwards for decades, involving the United States, Great 
Britain, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. Its main field of activities was the control of data 
traffic of telecommunication satellites. This close cooperation of the five countries (or the Big 
Five, as special literature labelled them) still exists. Former contract worker of the NSA Edward 
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Snowden disclosed a number of documents which shed some light on the magnitude of the 
global listening activities of the NSA. The publicised materials generated a tremendous uproar 
all over the World.  
It was disclosed that more than one billion people’s telephone and internet communication 
is tracked by the NSA, collecting information not only about terrorism but foreign policy, 
economy, particular trade issues as well. In mid-2012 the Agency recorded more than 20 billion 
communication events – so called metadata (internet and telephone) – every day.  
The NSA conducted large-scale espionage against the European Union, the United Nations 
Organisation, and a large number of governments which are otherwise close allies of the United 
States. In order to illustrate the capabilities of the organisation it needs mentioning that it has 
access to the servers of major on-line service providers, is capable of switching on the cameras 
and microphones of remote mobile telephones, tapping the traffic of undersea cables, and 
listening to remote Wi-Fi traffic. One of the most important units of the Organisation is TAO10, 
whose members are well trained hackers. They are tasked with the identification and monitoring 
of computer networks operated by foreign organisations, with hacking into them and gathering 
information from them. TAO cooperates with other intelligence organisations, such as the FBI 
and the CIA, and even assists them if necessary. They even deliver hackers to particular sites 
in order to allow them to have access to local networks or non-internet-based networks. [23]  
Therefore, as it can be seen, the United States is declaredly capable of conducting offensive 
operations in cyberspace.  
After the tremendous development phase of the past decades, China grew into the second 
largest economy of the World. Although the economic crisis of 2008 did not leave it unaffected, 
the growth of the Chinese economy did not stall. Naturally, the development of military 
capabilities is also constant. In 2016 defence spending grew faster than the GDP, as the increase 
was 7.6%, which is equal to USD 135bn. Computer network operations capabilities are also in 
the phase of permanent development. China regards the internet as a potential tool of war, and 
stimulates the training and equipping of experts and hackers, in order to penetrate adversary 
information networks. University courses are organised which are aimed at the preparation for 
launching and fending off attacks, at studying hackers’ methods, designing and applying 
computer viruses, and the problems of network security. [24]  
Reports made by leading network security companies of the World indicate that most of the 
IT attacks may be tracked back to Chinese perpetrators. Several reports mention Shanghai-
based military unit 61398, whose activities were classified as state secret by the Chinese 
government. The unit’s Headquarters is in Pudong, the financial centre of Shanghai, and it may 
have several thousand personnel, who speak very good English and possess excellent IT skills 
and knowledge. According to reports they have stolen hundreds of terabytes of data from the 
computers of 141 organisations since 2006. [25, p3] Of course, the Chinese defence ministry 
categorically denied any involvement of Beijing in any type of hacker activity. However, it is 
more than puzzling what simple hackers or criminals would have done with such an amount of 
data of such type.  
Russia is the third great player in cyberspace and it also claims not to have a cyber army. 
Nevertheless, it was Russia, which was suspect number one of the Estonian incident and of the 
attacks against Georgia. According to certain experts, the basis of Russia’s cyber-operations 
capabilities is comprised by cyber-criminal groups. Such groups conduct their activities with 
the tacit permission of the Russian government and get their incomes through classic cyber-
crime. Their capabilities are used – if necessary – against targets designated by the Russian 
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leadership. According to experts Russian cyber-capabilities are based on botnets11, and apart 
from that Russian hackers have leading role in hacking computer programs as well. The best-
known Russian group of cyber-criminals is the Russian Business Network (RBN), whose 
botnets were also involved in the DDoS attacks launched against Estonia in 2007. According 
to some sources personal connections can be detected among the leaders of the RBN, those of 
Russian state administration, and of secret services. [26] According to computer security 
experts, the Russian secret services participating in cyber-operations – primarily the Federal 
Security Service and the Federal Protective Service – cover up their information operations 
activities with establishing phantom firms or imitating the operations of the RBN and other 
cyber-criminal groups.  
Russia – similarly to China – regularly attacks the computer systems of the United States 
and other NATO member states. However, due to the nature of botnets it is impossible to prove 
that such activities are orchestrated by the Russian government. [27] Social networks are also 
frequently used for propaganda purposes. According to the accounts of two former workers of 
a Sankt Petersburg-headquartered company, hundreds of commenters working in shifts do their 
jobs in strictly regulated frameworks in order to share anti-western, pro-Kremlin news in 
domestic and foreign portals. The topics are identified in the beginning of every working day 
and a specific number of comments must be posted under certain profiles. However, conducting 
such activity is typical not only for Russia as other countries also use social networks for 
spreading propaganda. In Great Britain a unit, Brigade 77, was established within the army, and 
was tasked with conducting psychological operations in social networks. [28]  
Smaller states also develop their cyber-capabilities. Iran, for example, began to develop its 
military unit within the structure of the Revolutionary Guard after the cyberattacks in 2010. 
Merely one year later the unit successfully seized the control of an American unmanned aerial 
stealth vehicle – RQ-170 – and landed it unharmed. [29]  
North Korea also established its cyber warfare unit, squad 121, within the intelligence 
service. According to experts, the strength of the unit has grown to 6,000 personnel and several 
hundred of them work abroad. Their primary target is South Korea but this unit is held 
responsible also for the attack against Sony in 2014, which was allegedly motivated by a 
revenge for film “The Interview”. [30]  
Israel should also be mentioned as it has always been a pioneer in electronic development 
programs – it was the Israeli forces, for example, that used frequency hopping radios first time 
– and currently it has 10 percent of the World’s cyber security market, experts say. Besides the 
United States, Israel also took part in the development and deployment of Stuxnet against the 
Iranian Uranium enrichment facilities, although officially such an action has never been 
admitted. In early 2016 the establishment of a technological park in Beér-Seva was declared; 
its purpose is to found a cyber-security centre there with the involvement of private companies. 
According to the plans 15,000 people will work on IT-security there. The cyber-defence units 
of the armed forces will also be transferred there and the cyber warfare unit of the army – 
currently being in a nascent state – will also be located there. [31]  
In Germany CIR12, which will be the cyber warfare unit of the German military in 
subordination to the Bundeswehr, was established in 2017. The Bonn-headquartered Command 
had 260 personnel in the beginning but in accordance with the plans the number of military and 
civil employees will have grown to 13,500 by 2021. According to General Ludwig Leinhos 
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there was no time to waste after the series of computer attacks, and the unit had to be 
established. [32]  
In my opinion, apart from the above mentioned countries there are a lot of other states trying 
to develop their cyberattack capabilities. By now every involved party has realised the high 
significance of cyber defence. Several countries – including Hungary – established that legal 
background which supports the organisation of the defence. Most NATO member states have 
already elaborated their cyber-security strategies and shared them with each other. The 
strategies are public and may be accessed on the home page of the Cyber Centre of Excellence, 
together with similar documents of other, non-NATO countries. Among others the national 
cyber-security materials of Russia, China, Japan, Saudi Arabia, New Zealand, and South Africa 
may also be found there. However, international cooperation is indispensable as this is the only 
way of suppressing cyber-crime and cyber-terrorism. In this spirit two highly significant 
bilateral agreements have recently been signed, one between Russia and China and the other 
between the United States and China.  
The agreement between Russia and China was signed on 8th May 2015, expressing the 
resolute intent of the signatory parties to prevent unlawful activities in cyberspace, and the 
necessity of joint efforts in order to take actions against any types of cyber-crime and terrorism. 
A consensus was also achieved on not attacking each other’s systems and not providing any 
support to such intentions. The two countries will regularly inform each other on cyber threats 
and launch joint scientific and educational projects in the field of research and development.  
After the signing of the agreement some analysts had concerns about the opportunity that 
the two signatory states wanted to coordinate their cyber activities targeting the United States. 
Hopefully, this agreement is not about this. The fact that on 25th September 2015 US President 
Barack Obama and the President of China Xi Jinping also signed a bilateral agreement in the 
White House on the acceleration of information flow and provision of assistance in the case of 
malicious attacks underpins this opinion. The parties will not conduct or support deliberate 
cyberspace actions aimed at the stealth of intellectual property with the purpose to obtain 
business secrets or other confidential information appropriate for gaining business advantages, 
and they will improve their cooperation in countering cyber-crime.  
Another example of the bilateral cooperation is the agreement signed by Canada and China 
in June 2017. In it the two countries agree on not committing state-sponsored cyberattacks for 
obtaining business secrets or any other confidential business information from the other. [33] 
CONCLUSIONS  
In conclusion it can be stated that the rapid development of technologies made the issue of cyber 
security a top priority. By now this fact has been recognised by every country and measures 
have also been made in this field. International cooperation is paramount for the containment 
of cyber-crimes and terrorism. IT systems appear to have increasingly encompassed not just 
everyday life but also military forces. Military Command and Control systems (C2) and smart 
weapon systems will all work on network basis which will expose them to security risks. It has 
to be understood that in the conflicts of the years to come attacks launched against both military 
and civil networked electronic information management systems and critical IT system 
elements will play an increasingly significant role. All countries that will fail to establish 
capabilities in this field may be placed at a tremendous disadvantage because the establishment 
of cyber defence may not be sufficient in a conflict. This is why the countries in the World 
should be expected to spend an increasing amount of energy on the increase of their cyberattack 
potentials in the future.  
In my opinion Hungary should also establish a unit which would be capable of executing 
offensive operations in cyberspace. As it is demonstrated above, other states established such 
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units under military command and control within the structure of their armed forces. This 
arrangement may ensure an optimum exploitation of cyber warfare capabilities in military 
operations, and their coordination with other operations. To this end such a capability should 
be integrated in the structure of the Hungarian Defence Forces, and a close cooperation is 
needed with other domestic organisations responsible for cyber defence.  
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